Distributed Situation Awareness in Dynamic Systems: Theoretical Development and Application of an Ergonomics Methodology by Stanton, NA et al.
 
 
University of Birmingham
Distributed Situation Awareness in Dynamic
Systems: Theoretical Development and Application
of an Ergonomics Methodology
Stanton, NA; Stewart, R; Harris, D; Houghton, Robert; Baber, Christopher; McMaster,
Richard; Salmon, P
DOI:
10.1080/00140130600612762
Document Version
Early version, also known as pre-print
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Stanton, NA, Stewart, R, Harris, D, Houghton, R, Baber, C, McMaster, R & Salmon, P 2006, 'Distributed
Situation Awareness in Dynamic Systems: Theoretical Development and Application of an Ergonomics
Methodology', Ergonomics, vol. 49, no. 12-13, pp. 1288-1311. https://doi.org/10.1080/00140130600612762
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Mar. 2020
This article was downloaded by: [University of Birmingham]
On: 23 July 2012, At: 05:27
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered
office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Ergonomics
Publication details, including instructions for authors and
subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/terg20
Distributed situation awareness
in dynamic systems: theoretical
development and application of an
ergonomics methodology
N. A. Stanton a , R. Stewart b , D. Harris b , R. J. Houghton c , C.
Baber c , R. McMaster c , P. Salmon a , G. Hoyle d , G. Walker a , M.
S. Young a , M. Linsell e , R. Dymott f & D. Green a
a Human Factors Integration – Defence Technology Centre, BITlab,
School of Engineering and Design, Brunel University, Uxbridge,
Middlesex, UB8 3PH, UK
b Human Factors group, School of Engineering, Cranfield
University, Cranfield, Bedfordshire, MK43 0AL, UK
c Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, University
of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT, UK
d SEA, SEA House, PO Box 800, Bristol, BS16 1SU, Fishponds,
Bristol, UK
e Lockheed Martin UK Ltd – Integrated Systems, Building 7000,
Langstone Technology Park, Havant, Hants, PO9 1SW, UK
f MBDA Missile Systems, Golf Course Lane, Filton, Bristol, BS34
7QW, UK
Version of record first published: 20 Feb 2007
To cite this article: N. A. Stanton, R. Stewart, D. Harris, R. J. Houghton, C. Baber, R. McMaster,
P. Salmon, G. Hoyle, G. Walker, M. S. Young, M. Linsell, R. Dymott & D. Green (2006): Distributed
situation awareness in dynamic systems: theoretical development and application of an ergonomics
methodology, Ergonomics, 49:12-13, 1288-1311
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00140130600612762
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-
conditions
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any
substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,
systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.
The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation
that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any
instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary
sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings,
demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or
indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 B
irm
ing
ha
m]
 at
 05
:27
 23
 Ju
ly 
20
12
 
Distributed situation awareness in dynamic
systems: theoretical development and
application of an ergonomics methodology
N. A. STANTON*{, R. STEWART{, D. HARRIS{, R. J. HOUGHTONx,
C. BABERx, R. MCMASTERx, P. SALMON{, G. HOYLE{,
G. WALKER{, M. S. YOUNG{, M. LINSELL{{,
R. DYMOTT{{ and D. GREEN{
{Human Factors Integration – Defence Technology Centre, BITlab,
School of Engineering and Design, Brunel University, Uxbridge,
Middlesex UB8 3PH, UK
{Human Factors group, School of Engineering, Cranﬁeld University, Cranﬁeld,
Bedfordshire MK43 0AL, UK
xDepartment of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, University of Birmingham,
Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK
{SEA, SEA House, PO Box 800, Fishponds, Bristol BS16 1SU, UK
{{Lockheed Martin UK Ltd – Integrated Systems, Building 7000,
Langstone Technology Park, Havant, Hants PO9 1SW, UK
{{MBDA Missile Systems, Golf Course Lane, Filton, Bristol BS34 7QW, UK
The purpose of this paper is to propose foundations for a theory of situation
awareness based on the analysis of interactions between agents (i.e. both
human and non-human) in subsystems. This approach may help to promote a
better understanding of technology-mediated interaction in systems, as well
as helping in the formulation of hypotheses and predictions concerning
distributed situation awareness. It is proposed that agents within a system
each hold their own situation awareness, which may be very diﬀerent from
(although compatible with) that of other agents. It is argued that we should
not always hope for, or indeed want, sharing of this awareness, as diﬀerent
system agents have diﬀerent purposes. This view marks situation awareness
as a dynamic and collaborative process binding agents together on tasks on a
moment-by-moment basis. Implications of this viewpoint for the develop-
ment of a new theory of, and accompanying methodology for, distributed
situation awareness are oﬀered.
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1. Introduction
In this paper we present a description of distributed situation awareness (DSA) which is
system oriented, rather than individual oriented. We argue that this approach provides us
with a means of examining situation awareness (SA) in team working. Our aim is to
develop measures of DSA that can support prediction of performance and inform the
interpretation of observations made in the ﬁeld (e.g. in terms of explaining possible
mistakes, or of comparison of command and control across diﬀerent organizations).
Researchers such as Hollnagel (1993) and Hancock (1997) have made convincing
arguments for the system’s perspective in analysing human–machine interaction. The
hierarchical and heterarchical relationships and interactions between structures and
functions at diﬀerent levels have certainly served human factors researchers well in the
past (Rasmussen 1986, Meister 1989, Singleton 1989, Wilson and Corlett 1995, Salvendy
1997, Vicente 1999). In a review of contemporary team teamwork research, Paris et al.
(2000) found that most theories, models, and taxonomies comprise a tripartite input–
process–output approach from general systems theory. This seems to be a useful
distinction for the development of a predictive model. Indeed, the systems theoretic
approach would enable diﬀerent levels of description appropriate to the nature of the
prediction being oﬀered. The systems framework oﬀers the possibility of analysing
interactions and relationships at many diﬀerent levels and focusing of speciﬁc interactions
within subsystems. Researchers have suggested that technical aspects of the system are
part of the joint cognitive system (Hollnagel 1993). Research into trust and technology
suggests that there are shared traits between interpersonal trust and technological trust
(Muir 1994, Muir and Moray 1996). Ashleigh and Stanton (2001) have shown that those
shared traits included emotive constructs (i.e. conﬁdence, respect, commitment, and
teamwork), cognitive constructs (e.g. understanding, ability, and expectancy), and
behavioural constructs (e.g. reliability, performance, and communication). The authors
report that the people they interviewed did not distinguish between human and non-
human agents when using these constructs. The idea of collaborative human and non-
human SA agents seems to be a useful concept to carry forward into our theory.
We assume that, in distributed team work, cognitive processes occur at a systems rather
than an individual level. Thus if we take Endsley’s (1995) three-stage model of SA
(perception–comprehension–projection, which maps directly onto the tripartite input-
process-output systems approach), it is possible to apply this to a ‘system’ as shown in
table 1. In this example, a handheld gas analyser is used to determine whether fumes from
a chemical are at risky levels. Once a threshold has been exceeded, the ﬁre-ﬁghter carrying
the device decides to evacuate the area. The incident commander, watching the ﬁre-
ﬁghter, realizes that there is a risk and orders the crew to return to their vehicles.
This is quite a simple example as it is linear—output from the gas analyser is input for
the ﬁre-ﬁghter and, to a certain extent, the ﬁre-ﬁghter’s output is the commander’s
input—but it serves to illustrate two factors that are important to the approach developed
in this paper. First, the ‘knowledge’ that underlies DSA is distributed across the system.
Secondly, there is implicit communication of information rather than detailed exchange
of mental models. From the example in table 1, we can claim that the gas analyser
represents its readings through a display showing that thresholds have been exceeded.
Thus, as some of the signiﬁcant factors that will inﬂuence individual cognitive
performance will involve the representation, transformation, and manipulation of
information, i.e. from perception to cognition to action, so too can the systems-
level model address such factors. Indeed, much of the work on distributed cognition
Distributed versus overlapping situation awareness 1289
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(Hutchins 1991, 1995, Flor and Hutchins 1991, Perry 2003) has speciﬁcally addressed the
questions of representation, particularly in terms of the ways in which artefacts (and their
use by people) can be used to represent information in ways that can support the
‘immediate’ extraction of meaning by people (cf. the theory of aﬀordances (Norman
1988)), or can be used to embed complex manipulations into simple actions. It must be
emphasized at this point that the approach takes a systems view, rather than looking at
individuals. Therefore current conceptions of DSA do not take individual variables into
account. There are theories of SA that already do this very well, and the purpose of this
paper is to focus attention at a higher level in the system. This does not mean that
individual SA is dismissed; rather, a systems analysis cannot be accounted for by
summing independent individual analyses.
These fundamental ideas of SA distributed in a system lead us to propose a set of tenets
that could form the basis of a theory (Stanton et al. 2004a). These propositions are as
follows.
1. SA is held by human and non-human agents. As table 1 shows, technological
artefacts (as well as human operators) have some level of situation awareness (at least
in the sense that they are holders of contextually relevant information), in this case
the presence of toxic gas.
2. Diﬀerent agents have diﬀerent views on the same scene. As table 1 shows, the gas
analyser, ﬁre-ﬁghter and incident commander all have diﬀerent views on the scene, as
illustrated in their perception, comprehension, and projection of the incident.
3. Whether or not one agent’s SA overlaps with that of another depends on their
respective goals. Although they are part of the same ﬁre-ﬁghting system, the goal of
the gas analyser is to detect the level of toxic gas in the environment, the goal of the
ﬁre-ﬁghter is to determine the level of risk present in the environment, and the goal of
the incident commander is to decide on the appropriate response for his/her crew. In
terms of Endsley’s model of SA ,it could be that the diﬀerent agents are actually
representing diﬀerent stages of SA, rather than being microcosms of SA themselves—
the gas analyser perceives, the ﬁre-ﬁghter comprehends, and the incident commander
projects.
4. Communication between agents may be non-verbal behaviour, customs, and practice
(but this may pose problems for non-native system users). For example, the incident
commander takes the pause by the ﬁre-ﬁghter in the doorway as a signal that there is
something wrong.
5. SA holds loosely coupled systems together. The relationship between the gas
analyser, ﬁre-ﬁghter, and incident commander is held together by the by their
Table 1. DSA in part of a ﬁre-ﬁghting system.
Agent Perception Comprehension Projection
Gas analyser Senses level
of toxic gas
Calculates current
gas level and compares
against threshold
Indicates that gas
level could be hazardous
to health if exposure
prolonged
Fire-ﬁghter 1 Reads level
on meter
Determines high level
equates to risk to self
Need to exit building
Incident
commander
Sees ﬁre-ﬁghter
pause in doorway
Decides gas level
presents risk to crew
Switch to defensive response
1290 N. A. Stanton et al.
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respective levels or stages of awareness of the presence of toxins in the environments
and the most appropriate response.
6. One agent may compensate for degradation in SA in another agent. For example,
one ﬁre-ﬁghter may be unaware of the level of toxins in the environment until he/she
is informed by the gas analyser, another ﬁre-ﬁghter, or the incident commander.
The types of incident that we are exploring can be considered in terms of Klein’s (1989)
notions of naturalistic decision-making, i.e. agents in the ﬁeld are able to draw upon
their experience and expertise to make rapid diagnosis and to perform eﬀective actions
in very limited timeframes. In a similar fashion, Smith and Hancock (1995, p. 59)
propose that ‘SA is the up-to-the minute comprehension of task relevant information
that enables appropriate decision making under stress’. As our theory of SA operates at a
systems level, it has a diﬀerent perspective on the individual and shared SA approaches.
We feel that the shared SA approach could misdirect attention to inappropriate
aspects of the task, whereas there are points in tasks where SA may overlap for brief
periods in distributed team working. However, distributed SA requirements are not the
same as shared SA requirements. Shared SA implies shared requirements and purposes,
whereas distributed SA implies diﬀerent, but potentially compatible, requirements and
purposes.
Therefore our approach assumes that DSA can be deﬁned as activated knowledge for a
speciﬁc task within a system. This echoes the notion of Bell and Lyon (2000, p. 142) that
‘SA could be deﬁned as knowledge (in working memory) about elements of the
environment’. Therefore taking this notion into the realm of distributed cognition allows
us to propose that a situation requires the use of appropriate knowledge (held by
individuals, captured by devices, etc.) which relates to the state of the environment and
the changes as the situation develops. For the model presented in this paper, the
‘ownership’ of this knowledge is initially at the system rather than the individual level.
This notion could be further extended to include ‘meta-SA’, where knowledge of other
agents’ knowledge is contained in the system, such that each agent could potentially
know where to go when they need to ﬁnd something out.
2. Case study on Type 23 frigate operations control room at HMS Dryad
In order to apply the ideas of DSA to command and control, we have spent time at HMS
Dryad (which is the headquarters of the Royal Naval School of Maritime Operations,
where there are a number of land-based operations control room simulators) collecting
data on anti-air warfare, surface, and subsurface threat tasks. The Event Analysis of
Systemic Teamwork (EAST) methodology (see Walker et al. (2006) for a more in-depth
discussion of the approach) takes data from hierarchical task analysis (HTA) (Annett
2005) (Annett et al. (2000) have demonstrated how HTA can be used to capture the
principle components of teamwork in an anti-submarine warfare task), direct observation
of tasks, and debrieﬁng interviews using the critical decision method (Klein and
Armstrong 2005) to produce three main representations of a system: a social network, a
task network, and a knowledge network. We believe that these networks oﬀer diﬀerent,
but compatible, facets of systems representation. At the highest level of representation the
social network represents communication relations between people in the system
(Houghton et al. 2006). In the interests of brevity, this representation will not be shown
in the current paper. At the next level down, the task network shows the relationship
between goals of diﬀerent agents in the system. At the lowest level of representation is the
Distributed versus overlapping situation awareness 1291
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 B
irm
ing
ha
m]
 at
 05
:27
 23
 Ju
ly 
20
12
 
knowledge network, which shows the relationship between classes of information that the
system knows about in order to perform eﬀectively.
For the purposes of the HMS Dryad Type 23 frigate operations control room studies,
an observer was able to sit directly behind a crew member and to plug into his/her
console, allowing all radio exchanges to be heard. The anti-air warfare oﬃcer (AAWO)
was observed during the air threat, and the principal warfare oﬃcer (PWO) was observed
during the subsurface and surface threats. All forms of communication were recorded,
including verbal exchanges not communicated via radio, hand gestures, and written
communication (on paper). Figure 1 shows part of the Type 23 operations room.
Within these scenarios there are four main agents: the oﬃcer of the watch (OOW), the
PWO, the AAWO, and the captain. The OOW is an oﬃcer on the ship’s bridge who
maintains the visual lookout and controls the ship. The OOW can overrule the
manoeuvring orders from the operations room if he/she considers them to be dangerous.
The PWO is responsible for the tactical handling of the ship and the integrated use of its
weapons systems and sensors. The PWO takes a tactical command role in multi-threat
missions. The AAWO is responsible for the plan of defence in response to an air attack.
The captain oversees the operations room. In addition to personnel, the ship has a
computer-based command system which can communicate and control weapons and
sensor systems which allow information to be passed independently of the command
system itself. An illustration of the seating layout and an accompanying glossary are
given in ﬁgure 2 and table 2, respectively.
Originally, the primary task of Type 23 frigates was anti-submarine warfare. More
recently, their role includes air and surface warfare. All three scenarios ﬁt into similar
task models. In order to manage this scenario, a number of goals need to be addressed:
plan resources and strategy, control external resources, posture platform for attack,
identify and classify targets, assess threat and allocate targets, engage targets, and re-
allocate assets and weapons.
Figure 1. Illustration of workstations on board a Type 23 frigate showing a subset of
picture compilers.
1292 N. A. Stanton et al.
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The task model shown in ﬁgure 3 illustrates the relationship between these goals.
Before the mission, the planning of resources and strategy is undertaken. During the
mission the central tasks are performed concurrently by diﬀerent parts of the team. New
targets are identiﬁed and classiﬁed by the picture compilers and picture supervisors. The
targets are then assessed and prioritized by the AAWO and PWO, who allocate assets
and weapon systems to the high-priority threats. The targets are then engaged by the
assets and weapon systems as appropriate, and the degree of success is assessed.
Successfully damaging or deterring a target frees up the asset or weapon system for new
allocation. Missed targets may require re-allocation. At the same time as all this activity is
being undertaken, the platform is being postured to optimize the engagement or the
ability to evade enemy weapons. There is also a requirement to coordinate with other
platforms and control other external resources (such as ﬁghters and helicopters). Thus the
whole operation demands considerable coordination of both internal (to the platform)
and external resources and assets to manage a mission and deal with threats.
The majority of communications on board the Type 23 frigate are verbal, via the radio
circuits. The PWO and AAWO have access to 20 external circuits, of which there are four
Figure 2. Seating layout of a Type 23 frigate operations room. The asterisk denotes where
the AAWO is standing.
Table 2. The main agents involved in the mission.
Agent (title or acronym) Explanation of acronym
Captain
PWO Principal warfare oﬃcer
AAWO Anti-air warfare oﬃcer
ASWPS Anti-submarine picture supervisor
SPC Surface picture controller
EWD Electronic warfare director
MD Missile director
HC Helicopter controller
APS Air picture supervisor
Oﬀ Ship Other ships, aircraft, etc
Duty Staﬀ
OOW Oﬃcer of the watch
ASWD Anti-submarine warfare director
ASW Anti-submarine warfare oﬃcer
SPS/Surface Surface picture supervisor
Harpoon
CY Communication yeoman
AcPS Action picture supervisor
Distributed versus overlapping situation awareness 1293
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major nets. Internally there is one main ‘open line’ with up to 40 point-to-point
interphones. This method of communication has interesting implications for DSA, and
has proven advantages in other areas (e.g. air traﬃc control). Although the personnel sit
side-by-side, they communicate via headsets and microphones, and their visual attention
is focused on the displays in front of them. For some tasks there may only be marginal
advantage to be gained by the physical co-location of the team members, as noted by
Stanton et al. (2002). However, the common battle-space picture is built on the status
displays and screens in front of the AWO and PWO. This makes co-location of these
roles extremely important for a coordinated response. The subsurface and surface battles
are usually fought over one net, while the air battle is fought over another. The command
open line is used by the captain, AAWO, PWO, OOW, ASW Director, Duty Staﬀ, EW
director, missile and gun director, and communications yeoman, and on a part-time basis
by the helicopter controller. In addition to these radio channels, crew members speak face
to face and use hand-written notes. Pointing to the screens when matters need to be
clariﬁed was also observed.
The deepest level of analysis and representation provided is the knowledge network,
which describes the tasks that the system has to attend to in diﬀerent phases of activity.
The task network will be used to frame the knowledge network, in order to show the
knowledge network relevant to diﬀerent goals of the system. One of the advantages of
deﬁning network models is that it is possible to consider the potential eﬀects of changes in
those networks. For example, what would be the eﬀects of changing the task, social, or
propositional networks? Would DSA be improved, remain the same, or be adversely
aﬀected? Similar questions could be proposed with respect to mission eﬀectiveness,
workload, error rates, and timeliness of the systems response. However, our initial studies
Figure 3. Illustration of the task network representation for a Type 23 frigate.
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have focused on the modelling of contemporary system networks, as illustrated in the
next section.
3. DSA methodology
The DSA methodology comprises three main parts. In the ﬁrst part, the knowledge
owned by each party in each phase of the operation is elicited. The critical decision
method (CDM) has been used for this task. The second part is to extract ‘knowledge
objects’ from the CDM. Content analysis has been used for this task. The third and ﬁnal
part is to represent the relations between knowledge objects and identify in which
phase(s) they are activated. Propositional networks, comprising ‘subject’, ‘relation’, and
‘object’ network structures of the knowledge required by the system to describe any given
situation, were used for this task. Further details of the procedure and examples of the
results are given below.
3.1. Elicit the knowledge owned by each party
Flanagan (1954) developed an interviewing protocol which allowed him to investigate
‘critical incidents’ in aviation. The technique employs a semi-structured interview to elicit
key factors in accounts of incidents. In Flanagan’s approach, the method was used as a
vehicle for interviewing groups of respondents (as opposed to individuals). The interview
could commence with a broad question, such as: ‘Can you think of any incident or near-
miss or event which happened to you, or a colleague, which could have resulted in an
accident, given other circumstances?’ (Kirwan 1994, p. 66). The idea is that respondents
produce accounts of incidents which can then be discussed.
In recent years, the study of decision-making in real-world situations has received a
great deal of attention. While much of the work involves observation, there is also an
emphasis on the use of interviews to collect information. The critical decision method
(Klein 1989) is a form of critical incident technique. According to Klein (1989, p. 464),
‘The CDM is a retrospective interview strategy that applies a set of cognitive probes to
actual non-routine incidents that required expert judgment or decision making’. In this
approach, the interview proceeds through a series of four stages: brieﬁng and initial recall
of incidents, identifying decision points in a speciﬁc incident, probing the decision points,
and checking.
The CDM makes use of information provided during observation of a scenario
and from post hoc discussions. This information is elicited and structured using the
probe questions deﬁned by O’Hare et al. (2000) (table 3). A subject matter expert was
interviewed and CDM analyses were conducted for the air threat scenario, subsurface
threat, and surface threat scenario (only the ﬁrst of these three scenarios is presented here
because of space limitations).
3.2. Extract knowledge objects
In order to convert the CDM tables into propositions, a content analysis is performed. In
the ﬁrst stage, this simply means separating all content words from any function words.
For example, in response to one of the CDM probes, the SME answer that ‘The process is
scripted but the situation determines the plan, e.g. the nature of threat, degree of
intelligence available, climatic conditions’ would be reduced to the following knowledge
objects: ‘threat’, ‘intelligence’, and ‘weather’. Working through the table leads to a set of
Distributed versus overlapping situation awareness 1295
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knowledge objects. These are checked to ensure that duplication is minimized and are
then used to construct the propositional network.
In our interpretation of these activities we identify a network of knowledge objects. We
have deﬁned knowledge objects as the entities in the world that people detect, classify,
and manipulate. For example, knowledge objects would comprise knowledge of own and
enemy land, air, and sea assets (and the capabilities of these assets), targets, priorities,
radar bandwidths, plans, and strategies. There are potential knowledge objects for every
set of phenomena in the world. In this way we have interpreted the battle space as a
network of knowledge objects rather than a technological network. This is not to deny
the importance of the technological network, but to state that it is the correct activation
of the knowledge network which ensures that the whole system performs eﬀectively.
Table 3. Critical decision method probes.
Goal speciﬁcation What were your speciﬁc goals at the various decision points?
Cue identiﬁcation What features were you looking for when you formulated your
decision?
How did you know that you needed to make the decision?
How did you know when to make the decision?
Expectancy Were you expecting to make this sort of decision during the
course of the event?
Describe how this aﬀected your decision-making process
Conceptual Are there any situations in which your decision would have
turned out diﬀerently?
Describe the nature of these situations and the characteristics that
would have changed the outcome of your decision
Inﬂuence of uncertainty At any stage, were you uncertain about either the reliability or the
relevance of the information that you had available?
At any stage, were you uncertain about the appropriateness of the
decision?
Information integration What was the most important piece of information that you used
to formulate the decision?
Situation awareness What information did you have available to you at the time of the
decision?
Situation assessment Did you use all the information available to you when formulating
the decision?
Was there any additional information that you might have used to
assist in the formulation of the decision?
Options Were there any other alternatives available to you other than the
decision you made?
Decision blocking: stress Was there any stage during the decision-making process in which
you found it diﬃcult to process and integrate the information
available?
Describe precisely the nature of the situation
Basis of choice Do you think that you could develop a rule, based on your experience,
which could assist another person to make the same decision
successfully?
Why/Why not?
Analogy/generalization Were you, at any time, reminded of previous experiences in which
a similar decision was made?
Were you, at any time, reminded of previous experiences in which
a diﬀerent decision was made?
Source: O’Hare et al. (2000).
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The idea that ‘knowledge’ can be represented in the form of a network has been a
major source of discussion of memory in cognitive psychology since the 1970s. Initially,
researchers used semantic nets as a way of representing the association between items
within a concept. Such an approach gave rise to theoretical insights such as spreading
activation (Quillian 1969, Collins and Loftus 1975). The basic premise is that an item of
knowledge will be easier to process if it has a high level of activation. According to
Collins and Loftus (1975), other nodes linked to this active node also become activated,
i.e. ‘The spread of activation constantly expands, ﬁrst to all the nodes linked to the ﬁrst
node, then to all the nodes linked to each of these nodes, and so on’ (Collins and Loftus
1975, p. 408). One way of considering a semantic network is that it is like the ‘concept
mapping’ idea, i.e. one writes a single word in a box and then creates more boxes which
link to this initial word.
3.3. Represent the relations between knowledge objects and their activation
Propositional networks are like semantic networks in that they contain nodes (with
words) and links between nodes, but diﬀer in two ways. First, the words are not
necessarily randomly added to the network but involve the deﬁnition of propositions. A
proposition is a basic statement, i.e. ‘the smallest unit about which it makes sense to make
the judgement true or false’ (Anderson 1980, p. 102). Secondly, the links between words
are labelled to deﬁne the relationship between propositions. These relations might be in
terms of subject and object (in grammatical terms), with a corresponding relation term.
On the basis of such descriptions, it is possible to claim that one can produce dictionary-
like deﬁnitions of concepts through the application of basic propositions and operators
(Ogden 1987).
From the propositions derived through content analysis from the CDM tables, it is
possible to construct an initial propositional network to show the knowledge that is
related to this incident. The propositional network consists of a set of nodes which
represent objects, for example sources of information, agents, etc. that are linked through
speciﬁc operators. From this network, it should be possible to identify required
information and possible options relevant to this incident.
In the initial descriptions, the operators are simple relations such as ‘causes’, ‘knows’,
‘has’, and ‘is’. Thus the example knowledge objects ‘platform’, ‘intent’, ‘weapons’, and
‘threat’ would be represented as shown in ﬁgure 4.
The justiﬁcation for using a propositional network in this manner is that it represents
the ‘ideal’ collection of knowledge for a mission (and is probably best constructed
post hoc). As the incident unfolds, so participants will have access to more of this
knowledge (either through communication with other agents or through recognizing
changes in the incident status). An advantage of producing such a diagram is that,
through use of colour coding, it is possible to indicate in a simple visual manner the
relationship between speciﬁc agents and speciﬁc objects over the course of a mission.
As the mission unfolds, so diﬀerent nodes in this network will become active.
The active nodes might be relevant only to one or two agents within the system.
For example, the situation described began with planning resources and strategy.
This would cause the nodes relating to 5intelligence4, 5platform4, 5intent4,
5weapons4, 5scenarios4, 5threat4, and 5engage4 to be active. As the mission
progresses, so the activation of nodes alters. However, where there are jointly
active nodes, it is necessary to ensure some level of communication across agents.
The knowledge network provides a graphical representation of the ideas and forms
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the basis for a distributed theory of SA that is being developed from the work (Stanton
et al. 2004a).
The complete knowledge network for the surface, subsurface and air threat tasks is
shown in ﬁgure 5 (this ﬁgure was created using WESTT software (Houghton et al. 2005)
for the construction of propositional networks). The total situation for the system under
analysis is described by 64 knowledge objects. The knowledge network makes no
reference to any particular job roles, and technology is only referred to in a general sense
(e.g. weapons, satellite, radar, and sonar). While this is a general system-level
representation, activation of any of the knowledge objects has been identiﬁed with
particular tasks from the task network as shown in ﬁgures 6–12. As described in the task
network analysis, the knowledge network illustrated in ﬁgure 6 is performed prior to the
mission, and the knowledge networks illustrated in ﬁgures 7–12 are performed
concurrently by diﬀerent parts of the team and technological system. This activation of
the knowledge network illustrates the distributed situation awareness of the system in a
very literal sense.
Figure 6 shows the knowledge objects activated in the planning of resources and
strategy. Figure 7 shows the knowledge objects activated in the identiﬁcation and
classiﬁcation of targets. Figure 8 shows the knowledge objects activated in the assessment
of threat and the allocation of weapons and assets to targets. Figure 9 shows the
knowledge objects activated in the engagement of targets. Figure 10 shows the knowledge
objects activated in the reassessment of target engagement success and the reallocation of
weapons and assets to new targets. Figure 11 shows the knowledge objects activated in
the control of external resources. Figure 12 shows the knowledge objects activated in the
posturing of the platform for attack. These data are derived from the CDMs and HTA as
described earlier and were validated by subject matter experts. Analysis of the knowledge
object activated by each phase was conducted and is presented after the ﬁgures.
From this analysis, it is possible to identify the key knowledge objects that have
salience to each phase of operation. For the purpose of this analysis, salience is deﬁned as
Figure 4. Propositional network for air, surface, and subsurface threat tasks.
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those knowledge objects that serve as a central hub to other knowledge objects (i.e. have
ﬁve or more links to other knowledge objects). This criterion produces a list of 12
knowledge objects from a pool of 64 (approximately one-ﬁfth of the total number of
knowledge objects). The objects are intent, weapons, scenarios, threat, range, engage,
radar, targets, status, intelligence, platform, and hit potential. The purpose of this
analysis is to identify knowledge objects that play a central role in the threat tasks. Each
of these core knowledge objects is represented in a generic table against each stage for the
purpose of highlighting its role.
As table 3 shows, diﬀerent core knowledge objects are salient at diﬀerent points in the
operation (e.g. intent is relevant at the plan, allocate, engage, reassess and posture phases,
whereas intelligence is relevant only in the plan phase). The passing of knowledge objects
from one phase to another involves some manipulation of the object before it is passed
and then some means of communicating the nature of the object (e.g. the priority of
targets is assessed before weapon systems are allocated to them and then they may be
engaged), either implicitly or explicitly.
The purpose of this analysis is that it brings all three representations together, namely the
social network (i.e. whom is communicating with whom), the task network (i.e. the goals of
what is being done), and the knowledge network (i.e. the key features of SA for each phase
of operation). The HMS Dryad Type 23 operations control room studies showed highly
complex interactions between crew and communication channels. It is an extremely intense
environment and over a relatively short period of time (approximately 2 hours) an
enormous amount of communication occurred with information being transferred.
The methods indicate that a great deal of teamwork is occurring in each scenario
although there is a clear hierarchy. The PWO and AAWO still remain the central nodes
of the operations room. Information is shared between the crew members however the
majority of this information seems to be shared via the PWO and AAWO.
Shared awareness can be seen from the analysis in table 4. Many of the knowledge
objects are shared within the three individual scenarios (i.e. air, surface, and subsurface)
as well as across the whole mission. It is important to remember that the three scenarios
observed will often happen at the same time and will not be separated into three clear
Table 4. Analysis of core knowledge objects within the seven phases of operation.
Knowledge
objects
Plan
task
Identify
task
Allocate
task
Engage
task
Reassess
task
Control
task
Posture
task
Intent
Weapons
Scenarios
Threat
Range
Engage
Radar
Targets
Status
Intelligence
Platform
Hit potential
Count of knowledge
objects
7/12 5/12 8/12 10/12 8/12 9/12 10/12
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areas. Thus the sharing of knowledge objects across scenarios will be essential for
eﬀective operations.
There is the implication that DSA could be viewed in terms of the activated knowledge
objects, and these activations change over the course or phases of a mission. This has
implications for workload and levels of uncertainty. We speculate that the workload and
uncertainty might increase with the number of knowledge objects that need to be
managed. Workload might simply increase because there is more knowledge to manage
whereas uncertainty might increase because there are more things to keep track of. This
hypothesis requires further empirical investigation. The results of this application of the
methodology are intended to form a part of wider data collection and analysis with a view
to developing a generic model of command and control.
Now that the network models have been deﬁned, it should be possible to consider the
potential eﬀects of changes in those networks. As mentioned in the introduction to this
paper, these questions include addressing the eﬀects of changing the task, social, or
propositional networks and the subsequent eﬀects on DSA, workload, error rates,
timeliness of response, and overall mission eﬀectiveness. This will be the focus of our
subsequent research.
4. Conclusions
The idea that there exists a network of knowledge objects for the entire system raises
some interesting points about shared awareness. First, we claim that it is the system as a
whole, rather than a given individual, that holds all relevant knowledge; individuals have
diﬀerent views of this network. Secondly, the view that an individual has must be
suﬃcient to support the activity that he/she performs, i.e. command activity requires
high-level awareness of a wide range of knowledge objects, whereas target tracking
requires low-level detailed awareness of a subset of knowledge objects. Third ‘sharing’
awareness does not necessarily entail communication between individuals; it might be
confusing or misleading if all individuals attempted to share all their separate views of the
situation. Rather, it is important for the agents within a system to have awareness of who
is likely to hold speciﬁc views and, consequently, to interpret the potential usefulness of
information that can be passed through the network in terms of these views. Extending
the DSA to Endsley’s conception of SA would mean that some individuals are engaged in
perception tasks (such as the picture compilers and picture supervisors), some are
engaged in comprehension and in the projection tasks (such as the anti-air warfare oﬃcer
and the principle warfare oﬃcer) and other are engaged in the response execution tasks
(such as the missile directors and the electronic warfare director). Thus, referring back to
the DSA analysis of the ﬁre-ﬁghting system, we argue that the theory and method work
equally well with single-person–machine systems as well as with large multi-person–
machine systems, as DSA is concerned with how knowledge is used and parsed between
agents in systems interaction.
Indeed, this latter point may even hold the key to DSA. Assuming that performance
will be most eﬀective when there is ‘good’ DSA throughout the system as a whole, it
follows that the network links are more crucial than the nodes themselves in maintaining
DSA. Moreover, there are then two aspects of SA at any given node: individual SA of
one’s own task, and a ‘meta-SA’ of the whole system’s DSA. Given that eﬀective team-
working depends on information transfer across the network links, knowing which links
to use (and where to oﬀer information when needed) will really determine the quality of
DSA, and thus is perhaps the truest description of DSA itself.
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The distributed cognition approach has been successfully used to analyse the cognitive
properties of a variety of environments (Perry 2003), adding to our understanding of the
cognitive processes that are taking place over and above information gleaned from studies
concentrating solely on individual cognition (Flor and Hutchins 1991). It has also
highlighted a new level of study for other research areas, including DSA. The DSA
approach does not dispute that the individuals in the system will have their own awareness
of a situation, or that groups of individuals may share some level of understanding of the
situation (Artman and Garbis 1998). It is asserted that complex problem-solving systems
will have their own cognitive properties (including SA) which cannot be accounted for by
individual cognition and that to study a system at the level of the individual will fail to pick
up on these systems-level features (Hutchins 1995, Perry 2003).
The knowledge and task networks shown in ﬁgures 5–12 are based on observational
data and provide us with model exemplars of DSA for speciﬁc tasks in this environment.
These could be used to diagnose problems in system performance where such problems
are attributed to failures in DSA. Taking the models one step further, it may even be
possible to use the networks in a predictive fashion to run simulations of diﬀerent task
structures. Therefore the DSA approach has implications for the design of the working
environment (e.g. in terms of team structure), which can impact the ﬂow of information
through the system, and for human–computer inteactions, because of the importance of
technological artefacts in distributed environments (Artman 2000).
By viewing SA ﬁrst as a systems-level phenomenon, it is possible to identify the aspects of
a situation about which agents require knowledge. By viewing the active knowledge in each
state of an incident, it is possible to determine who knows what at a given time. From this
perspective, it becomes possible to indicate how information needs to disseminate through
the system for eﬀective performance and to identify possible barriers to eﬀective
dissemination. One of the keys to eﬀective DSA is links, since it is not possible to have
DSA without communication. The graphical representation provides a simple but eﬀective
means by which system SA can be mapped. From this work we further propose that adding
additional communications requirements (through which agents share or communicate
their mental models) can add signiﬁcant burden to the processes and may actually impede
SA by introducing tasks that might serve to activate additional but unnecessary nodes in
the network, introducing time delays between receiving and acting upon information, and
inappropriate emphasis on some links in the network. The challenge at present is to
continue to collect evidence that will enable us to substantiate this theory. In particular, our
work focuses on the question of how best to describe SA at a system’s level and how
communication between agents within a system can support eﬀective performance.
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